We analyze a competitive search environment where heterogeneous workers and firms make costly investments (e.g. in education and physical capital, respectively) before they enter the labor market. A key novelty with respect to existing work is that we allow for multidimensional heterogeneity on both sides of the market. Our environment features transferable utility and symmetric information. As in classical hedonic models, wages depend both on the job's and on the worker's match-relevant characteristics. Yet the presence of search frictions implies that (unlike in those models) markets do not clear. The hedonic wage function and probabilities of finding and filling different jobs are determined endogenously in a competitive search equilibrium. We show that constrained efficient allocations can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem, whereas the wage function supporting these allocations and associated expected payoffs for workers and firms correspond to the solutions of the `dual' of that linear program. We use this characterization to show that a competitive search equilibrium exist and is constrained efficient under very general conditions. Jerez (2014) makes a similar point in the context of a model where all the match-relevant characteristics of the traders are exogenous. Here we extend the analysis to allow for two-sided ex-ante investments which are potentially multidimensional. The fact that linear programming techniques have been used for the structural estimation of frictionless matching models suggests that our framework is potentially useful for empirical studies of labor markets and other hedonic markets (like that for housing) where search frictions are prevalent Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D50, D61, D83.
Introduction
Since the seminal work of Diamond (1981 Diamond ( , 1982 , Mortensen (1982a Mortensen ( , 1982b and Pissarides (1984 Pissarides ( , 1985 , search equilibrium models have become a dominant paradigm to study labor markets. These models abandon the classical assumption of a frictionless trading process that always clears the market. The so-called Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and bargaining model instead introduces a costly trading technology by means of an exogenous matching function which generates simultaneous rationing (and thus trading delays) on both sides of the market. Such a model generates frictional unemployment in equilibrium, and is consistent with the simultaneous coexistence of unemployment and unlled job vacancies. This kind of two-sided rationing is observed in other markets. In the housing market, for instance, in a given period (e.g. each month) there are owners with property on the market who do not manage to sell, and households searching for a housing unit who do not complete a transaction during the period either. 1
Competitive search (also referred to as directed search) models have received an increasing attention in recent years. These models deviate from the search and bargaining model in that they abstract away from ineciencies arising from bilateral monopoly power. The earlier competitive search literature instead focuses solely on search and matching frictions (e.g. see Montgomery (1991) , Peters (1991 Peters ( , 1997 Peters ( , 2000 , Moen (1997) , Shimer (1996 Shimer ( ,2005 , Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a, 1999b) , Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) , Shi (2001) , and Mortensen and Wright (2002) ). In competitive search models of the labor market, rms typically compete ex ante by publicly posting (and committing to) job oers, and workers then direct their search to the more attractive oers.
Because rms posting more attractive oers attract more job applicants on average, they are able to ll their vacancies faster. 2 Montgomery (1991) , Peters (1991) , Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996) were among the rst to show that competitive search equilibria are constrained ecient. Whereas these authors consider simple environments with homogeneous buyers and/or sellers, subsequent 1 Search models are becoming increasingly popular in quantitative studies of the housing market. See, among others, Díaz and Jerez (2013) , Head, Lloyd-Ellis, and Sun (2014) and Ngai and Tenreyro (2014) , and the literature cited therein.
2 By contrast, in search and bargaining models wages are determined ex post, once the rm and the worker meet (e.g. by means of the generalized Nash bargaining rule), so they do not aect the traders' rationing probabilities.
Competitive search models dier also from the price posting models introduced by Burdett and Judd (1983) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998) . The later models feature imperfect competition since, even though rms compete ex ante by posting wages, (rather than directing their search to the more attractive oers) workers sample randomly from the wage oer distribution. See Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) for a comprehensive review of the labor search literature. 1 work has generalized their results to more general environments. In particular, Shi (2001 ), Shimer (2005 , Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) allow for two-sided one-dimensional heterogeneity. This paper is particularly related to the work of Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b) , Shi (2001) and Masters (2011) , who argue that competitive search solves the familiar hold-up problem. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b) analyze a model where rms make investments in physical capital before entering the labor market, so as to increase the value of future production. They show that, in the search and bargaining model, rms' investments are ineciently low, partly because some of the surplus these investments generate is appropriated by the rms' future employees (see also Acemoglu (1996) ).
3 With competitive search, however, rms have additional incentives to invest. Because rms making higher investments are more productive, they can also oer higher wages. This in turn allows them to ll their job vacancies faster. In a competitive search equilibrium the share of the surplus that accrues to a rm is determined endogenously, and this share is such that rms receive the social marginal product of their investment. As a result, the rms' ex-ante investments are ecient. Whereas in Acemoglu and Shimer's (1999b) model workers and rms are homogeneous and only rms make ex-ante investments, Shi (2001) shows that the eciency result holds also if workers have heterogeneous skills. Masters (2011) reaches the same conclusion in a model where homogeneous workers and rms make complementary ex-ante investments in physical and human capital, respectively. In all three papers the observability of the agents' investments and of their match-relevant characteristics which rules out asymmetric information problems is crucial for the eciency result.
To the best of our knowledge, the model in this paper is the rst in the search literature which jointly captures the rich two-sided heterogeneity which characterizes the labor market, and the fact that agents on both sides of the market may make ex-ante investments so as to enhance their match-relevant characteristics. It is worth noting that models with these features do exist in the frictionless matching literature (e.g. Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001) , Peters (2009) and Felli and Roberts (2016) allow for one-dimensional two-sided heterogeneity, and Dizdar (2015) allows for multidimensional two-sided heterogeneity). 4 Following the latter literature, we consider an environ-3 Acemoglu (1996) studies a search and bargaining model where workers also make ex-ante investments.
4 The authors study the eciency and existence properties of competitive equilibria under full information. See also Peters and Siow (2002) , who study an environment with non-transferable utility. Recent work by Samuelson (2013, 2016) extends the analysis of Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001) to an adverse selection environment where the worker's investments are private information. ment with transferable utility and complete information about the match-relevant characteristics of the traders. 5 The class of economies we study is large, as we allow for general production, utility and matching functions, general distributions of worker and rm types, and endogenous market participation.
As is standard in the applied labor literature (e.g. studying how labor market outcomes vary across dierent groups of workers 6 ), in our model workers are heterogeneous in several dimensions, and the same is true for the jobs rms create. As emphasized by Lucas (1977) , a distinguishing feature of labor markets is that, just like the payos of the rms depend on the match-relevant characteristics of the workers they hire, the workers' payos depend on the hedonic attributes of the jobs performed. From this perspective, our framework can be viewed as embedding the classical hedonic model of Rosen (1974) and Lucas (1977) into the competitive search formulation.
We consider an environment where workers dier in several exogenous characteristics (e.g. age, gender, innate talent...), and may invest in a multidimensional vector of hedonic attributes (e.g. years and quality of schooling, skills acquired/enhanced through education,· · · ) before they apply for a job. Jobs are modeled as dierentiated goods (e.g. indexed by occupation, tasks and skill requirements, working conditions, location and hours...). Prior to hiring their employees, rms make multidimensional investments (e.g. in technology and computerization, plant and equipment,...).
These investments aect the value of employing dierent kinds of workers. In particular, in certain 5 See Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a) for a competitive search model with risk aversion, and Peters and Severinov (1997) , Faig and Jerez (2005) , Guerrieri (2008) , Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) and Moen and Rosen (2011) for extensions which feature asymmetric information. See also recent work by Fernández-Blanco and Gomes (2016), who consider a version of Shi (2001) 's model where the worker's productivity is unobservable to the rm. 6 By way of example, it is worth mentioning a few interesting contributions. For instance, Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schnberg (2009) challenge previous work claiming that (unlike in the US) the wage distribution in Germany was fairly stable in the 1980s and the 1990s, and instead document a substantial increase in wage inequality. The authors decompose the relative importance of the main drivers of the increase in inequality both for the top and the bottom tails of the wage distribution. These include changes in the workforce composition (in terms of age and education), demand factors such as the polarization of labor demand across occupations requiring dierent skill levels (which is linked to computerization) and changes in labor market institutions. Another well-known paper by Bover, Arellano, and Bentolila (2002) uses a longitudinal sample of Spanish men in 1987-94 to study the inuence benet duration on the exit rate from unemployment into employment, controlling for observed worker characteristics (e.g. education, age, being or not head of the household,...), for unobserved worker heterogeneity, and for sectoral dummy variables. Carrasco and García-Pérez (2015) perform a similar analysis of the Spanish labor market distinguishing between natives and immigrants (by country of origin of the latter). Finally, a recent paper by Burstein, Morales, and Vogel (2015) , seeks to identify the main drivers behind the pronounced changes in relative wages across groups of workers with dierent characteristics in the US in the past decades. The authors develop and estimate a (frictionless) occupational choice model where workers of dierent gender and education level are assigned across dierent jobs and equipment types (one of which is computers). Their results point to computerization and to changes in task productivity as the main drivers of changes in between-education-group inequality and the rise of the skill premium.
According to their estimates, these factors also explain roughly half of the rise in the female/male wage. 3 jobs (e.g. involving routine or easy to automate tasks), investments in computerization make it easier to replace workers with machines (as the two production inputs become highly substitutable). If so, workers in turn will benet from investing in attributes which are complements (rather than substitutes) to the new capital. 7 The rm's investments may also aect the hedonic attributes of the jobs rms create. For instance, the rms' investment in technology/equipment can aect the tasks performed by workers, 8 their working conditions (e.g. the degree of health risk implied by the job), and even the job's location (e.g. in certain occupations, computerization increasing allows working from home).
In our model, the hedonic wage function and the probabilities of lling and nding dierent jobs are determined endogenously in a competitive search equilibrium. Under the aforementioned symmetric information assumption, we show that competitive search equilibria are constrained ecient, and provide a general existence theorem. In these sense, our results generalize those of Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b) , Shi (2001) and Masters (2011) to a large class of competitive search environments. While our presentation focuses on the labor market, the model applies to other hedonic markets (like that for housing) where search frictions are prevalent. 9
There is an important methodological dierence between this paper and the search literature cited above. Whereas this literature uses strategic (game-theoretic) models, here we adopt the Walrasian (price-taking) approach proposed in Jerez (2014) . In a nutshell, that paper shows that the Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium notion can be extended to environments with search frictions, essentially by replacing market clearing with a trading technology that is not frictionless (e.g. an exogenous matching technology). The key modeling choice is to incorporate the uncertainty arising from rationing in the denition of a commodity (in the spirit of the Arrow-Debreu theory). Prices of commodities then depend not only on their physical characteristics, but also on the probability that their trade is rationed. In a competitive equilibrium traders take prices as given. They also take as given rationing probabilities, because they are part of the description of a commodity. In equilibrium, the price system adjusts so that the optimal decisions of the agents are consistent with 7 Deming (2015) nds evidence that in the past decades socials skills have been increasingly rewarded by the labor market, specially when combined with cognitive skills. 8 For instance, Deming (2015) shows that advances in information and communication technology tend to increase job rotation and the degree of worker multitasking. 9 Houses are dierentiated goods that are valued for their hedonic characteristics. Whereas some of these characteristics are exogenous, house owners and landlords oftentimes invest in costly renovation activities which alter the houses' attributes before they put their property on the market. the trading technology. Jerez (2014) shows that this price-taking equilibrium notion is a reduced form of the strategic notion used in the literature. The point is made in the context of a related model where all the match-relevant characteristics of the traders are exogenous. Here we extend the Walrasian model in Jerez (2014) to allow for two-sided ex-ante investments which are potentially multidimensional.
The strength of the Walrasian formulation is that it allows us to apply the powerful tools of general equilibrium theory to derive our main results. Specically, both here and in Jerez (2014) , we adopt the linear programming approach used by Shapley (1955) , Shapley and Shubik (1972) , and Grestky, Zame (1992, 1999) to study frictionless matching models with transferable utility. (See also more recent work by Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim (2010) and Dizdar (2015) , among others). Specically, we show that constrained ecient allocations can be determined as solutions to a linear programming (LP) problem, whereas the hedonic wage function supporting these allocations and the associated expected payos for workers and rms correspond to the solutions of the dual of that linear program. We use this characterization to show that competitive search equilibria exist and are constrained ecient. Linear programming techniques have not only proved useful to derive the properties of equilibrium allocations in dierent settings. 10 They have also been used in empirical work. In particular, Galichon and Salanié (2012) , Dupuy and Galichon (2014) , and Fox (2010) use these techniques for the identication and estimation of frictionless matching models with transferable utility. This suggests that a similar methodology could be used to take competitive search models to the data at a high degree of disaggregation.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 describes the environment. In Section 3 we present the general equilibrium model and dene a competitive search equilibrium. For the purpose of the exposition, these sections assume that rms are ex-ante symmetric an assumption which is widely used in the literature (e.g. Shi (2001) ). Section 4 describes the LP problem and its dual, and characterizes constrained ecient allocations via the complementary slackness theorem of linear programming. As in Grestky, Zame (1992, 1999) , the welfare and existence theorems follow directly from this theorem. Section 5 presents the general version of the model where rms 10 Makowski and Ostroy (1996, 2003) analyze a (frictionless) competitive economy with divisible goods. Myerson (1984) highlights the linear programming structure of principal agent models, an structure which has been exploited by Manelli and Vincent (1995) to characterize optimal procurement mechanisms. Jerez (2003) and Song (2012) exploit this linear structure to analyze competitive economies with informational (but no search) frictions. See also the book by Dorfman, Samuelson, and Solow (1987) . 5 are heterogeneous ex-ante, and shows that it is just a twist of the model presented so far. The LP formulation corresponding to the general model and the technical details are presented in the Appendix.
The Environment
Consider a one-period search model with a measureξ ∈ ++ of ex-ante symmetric rms, 11 and a continuum of heterogeneous workers. Worker types are indexed by s ∈ S, where S is a compact set.
The population of workers is described by a Borel measure on S with full support: ξ S ∈ M + (S).
As is customary in the literature, we assume that rms are risk neutral and workers have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions which are quasilinear in a divisible numeraire. Also, each rm has a single job opening, and workers can have at most one job.
Prior to entering the labor market, both workers and rms can choose to make investments which aect the output that will be produced when a rm employs a worker. Workers of type s can invest in a list of attributes h ∈ H at cost c(s, h). Think of h as a description of the worker's education (e.g. years and quality schooling, skills acquired/enhanced through education,· · · ), and of s as a list of exogenous characteristics, some of which may aect the cost of acquiring education.
For instance, workers may dier in their innate talent or in their social background. For some types s, certain values of h may be simply unattainable because c(s, h) is too large. Firms can also make multidimensional ex-ante investments a ∈ A (e.g. in a specic technology, equipment type, . . . ) at cost C(a). We assume that c(s, h) and C(a) are continuous functions. So, for workers with similar exogenous characteristics, the costs of acquiring similar attributes are similar. And, for a given rm, the costs of making similar investments are also similar. Workers and rms may not invest at all; these choices are denoted by h 0 ∈ H and a 0 ∈ A, respectively, where c(·, h 0 ) = C(a 0 ) = 0. In what follows, we take S, H and A to be arbitrary compact metric spaces.
A rm which invests in a and hires a worker with attributes h produces f (h, a) units of output. 12 We assume that f is continuous, so rms making similar investments have similar production 11 In this version of the model, all the attributes of a job are endogenous and will depend on the rm's ex-ante investments (see below). 12 So output depends on the endogenous investments of the worker and the rm, but does not depend on the worker's type (e.g. see also Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001) ). We could instead assume that output depends on both on the worker's type and on the attributes she has acquired (e.g. see Felli and Roberts (2016)). In general, 6 technologies, and workers with similar attributes have similar productivity at a given job.
The worker's disutility of labor depends on the job's hedonic attributes, which we assume are determined by a. This disutility, which we denote by v(s, h, a), may also depend on the worker's exogenous characteristics s and/or endogenously acquired attributes h. For instance, as a recent article in The Economist notes, blue-collar male workers are usually reluctant to work in certain jobs, such as health workers or hairdressers, which have been traditionally regarded as feminine. 13
Another illustrative example is that of female workers who have children, who oftentimes have a preference for jobs which are compatible with child rearing (e.g. teaching and part-time jobs, and jobs that allow to work from home). 14 We assume that the function v is continuous, so the disutility of labor at a given job is similar for workers whose types and attributes are similar. We normalize the disutility of the unemployed to zero. We shall assume that, for each choice a ∈ A rms can make, there is a worker type s ∈ S and a choice of h ∈ H by that worker type that generates a positive bilateral surplus:
The ex-ante investments of workers and rms are assumed observable, so rms know the kind of labor they are hire and workers know the kind of jobs they accept. As in the Arrow-Debreu model, the payos of the agents are private information, and all the relevant information is transmitted through wages.
Following Lucas (1977) , the jobs created in matches where the jobs' attributes a and/or the worker's attributes h dier are regarded as dierentiated. 15 These dierentiated jobs will be created in dierent (segmented) labor markets. 16 Many dierentiated jobs, indexed by (h, a) ∈ H × A, can then potentially be created in our model. Whether or not type-(h, a) jobs are created (i.e., some workers choose h, some rms choose a, and some of these workers end up working for some of these rms) will be determined endogenously in equilibrium. The reader may want to think of the special some types may be more productive at certain jobs. (For instance, Deming (2015) mentions the female advantage in social skills, and conjectures that it is related with the fall in the wage gender gap.) In our model these dierences are embedded in the cost c(h, s) of acquiring attributes that are required for performing that job eectively. In any case, all our results go through when output is given by f (s, h, a) provided the components of s that aect f are observable.
13 See article The Weaker Sex, May 30th 2015.
14 See Erosa, Fuster, Kambourov, and Rogerson (2016). 15 Admittedly, for some low-skilled jobs, the worker's investments may not matter in terms of output: f (h, a) = f (a).
It is easy to devise a simple variant of the model where these jobs are described by a only.
16 This is a standard feature of directed search (as opposed to random search) models. See, for instance, Shi (2001) and Menzio and Shi (2010) . These authors treat the worker's attributes as exogenous. In particular, in Shi's model, output is given by f (a, s) and a job is described by a pair (a, s), where both a and s are one-dimensional objects. 7 case where the set of jobs that can be created is nite. Indeed, in empirical applications S, H and A will be nite sets (i.e., s will be a nite list of characteristics, each of which can take a nite number of values, and so will h and a). 17
The trading process in the labor market is characterized by search frictions, meaning that not all workers searching for a job will nd one and the same is true for rms who seek to ll a vacancy.
Moreover, job lling and job nding probabilities will vary across jobs (e.g. some jobs may be harder to nd/ll than others). This is in contrast to a Walrasian labor market where workers and rms can trade instantaneously at the wages that clear the market.
We assume that rms who seek to ll vacancies of type-(h, a) and workers searching for these kind of jobs meet bilaterally and at random. It is standard in the literature to describe this random meeting process by an exogenous matching function with constant returns to scale. To ease notation, suppose that the matching function is the same in all markets. Let β be the measure of rms and σ the measure of workers in a given market. The matching function M(β, σ) determines the total measure of bilateral matches, where M : R 2 + → R + is continuous, increasing, and homogeneous of degree one. Since the total number of matches cannot exceed the number of traders in the short side of the market, M(β, σ) ≤ min{β, σ}. In particular, M(0, σ) = M(β, 0) = 0 (e.g. if no workers invest in h and/or no rms invest in a, no jobs of this type will be created).
We assume that the Law of Large Numbers holds, so the probability that a worker nds a job in this market is
where θ = β σ ∈ + is the ratio of rms to workers searching in the market, or the level of market tightness. Likewise, the probability that a rm nds an employee in this market is
with the convention that α(0) = lim θ→0 α(θ). The function m(θ) is continuous and increasing, whereas α(θ) is continuous and decreasing. It is standard to assume that m(0) = 0, lim θ→∞ m(θ) = 1, α(0) = 1 and lim θ→∞ α(θ) = 0. Intuitively, the higher the market tightness θ, the easier it is 17 In this case, the continuity of c, C, f and v holds trivially.
8 for workers to nd a job and the harder it is for rms to ll a job in a given market. As θ goes to innity (zero), the job nding probability goes to one (zero) and the job lling probability goes to zero (one). Note that α(θ) and m(θ) also represent the fractions of rms and workers in the market who are successful in their search for an employment relationship, whereas 1 − α(θ) and 1 − m(θ)
are the fractions of rms and workers who are rationed.
Our analysis and all our results extend directly to the case where the matching function diers across jobs. For instance, the use of digital platforms which allow to match workers with jobs more eciently is more widespread in some job markets than in others (e.g. that for computer engineers vs. that for machine operators or domestic workers). In this more general case, the total number of bilateral matches in the market for type-(h, a) jobs is given byM(β, σ; h, a), whereM be continuous (so the random matching process for similar jobs is similar), and where, for a given (h, a),M(·, ·; h, a) has the properties stated above.
3 The general equilibrium model
In this section we show that constrained ecient allocations can be characterized as solutions to a LP problem. We then dene a competitive (price-taking) search equilibrium. The analysis follows closely that in Jerez (2014) . As we have already noted, in that paper the characteristics of the traders on both sides of the market are exogenous. Also, in Jerez (2014) buyers have dierent valuations depending on the type of seller they trade with (because dierent seller types oer dierent goods), but the valuations of the sellers do not depend on the characteristics of the buyers they trade with.
By contrast, in the current model, just like the rm's payo depends on the worker's attributes, the worker's payo depend on the attributes of the job performed. As we have already noted, this is a distinguishing feature of labor markets.
Allocations
An allocation is an assignment of workers and rms to dierent markets. We represent a market by a triple (h, a, θ) ∈ H × A × + , describing the type of job created (h, a) and the tightness level θ prevailing in the market. Consistency requires that only workers investing in h and rms investing in a are assigned to market (h, a, θ) (see below). Recall that the value of θ determines the probabilities of nding and lling a job, and thus the degree of trading uncertainty that workers and rms face in this market. In the spirit of Arrow-Debreu theory, our description of the commodities traded in the dierent markets, (h, a, θ) ∈ H × A × + , includes this trading uncertainty. To allow for the possibility of non-participation, we introduce an arbitrary real number θ 0 < 0, and extend the probability functions in (2.1) and (2.2) to the set Θ ≡ + ∪ {θ 0 } by setting m(θ 0 ) = α(θ 0 ) = 0. Agents who do not participate in the labor market will be assigned to the ctitious market x 0 = (h 0 , a 0 , θ 0 ). 18
As is standard in general equilibrium models with a continuum of heterogeneous agents, we use measures to describe allocations. We rst introduce some necessary notation. For a given a metric 
Feasible allocations
Feasible allocations assign (almost) all the workers and rms in the economy to an element of X. That is, the total measure of rms assigned under the allocation must be equal toξ:
whereas the total measure of assigned workers of a given type s must be equal to the measure of such types who are present in the population:
Feasible allocations must also be consistent with respect to the matching technology, so that in each active market the measure of workers who nd jobs is equal to the measure of job vacancies lled by rms:
Recall that µ B describes the measure of rms assigned to the dierent markets, and that the fraction of rms who ll a vacancy in market (h, a, θ) is equal to α(θ). The term on the left-hand side of (3.3) thus represents the measure of rms which successfully ll a vacancy in an arbitrary set of markets Ω ⊂ H × A × + (and thus the measure of jobs that are created in those markets). Likewise, since µ S X describes the measure of workers assigned to the dierent markets and m(θ) is the fraction of workers who nd a job in market (h, a, θ), the right-hand side of (3.3) represents the measure of workers who nd a job in the set of markets Ω.
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Constrained ecient allocations
In the presence of search frictions the social planner can assign workers and rms to dierent markets, but cannot directly assign workers to rms (as in frictionless matching models). Formally, the problem of the planner is to choose a feasible allocation so as to maximize social welfare, h, a, θ) . 
Competitive search equilibrium
Let w(h, a, θ) ∈ + denote the wage in market (h, a, θ) ∈ H × A × + . As in classical hedonic models, wages depend both on the attributes of the worker and the attributes of the job. Moreover, as in competitive search models, wages also depend on the market tightness level. The dependence of wages on θ is intuitive. When θ is lower, rms are more likely to ll a job vacancy, so (other things equal) they are willing to pay higher wages to complete a transaction. Similarly, since workers are more likely to nd a job when θ is higher, they are also willing to accept lower wages under this circumstances. It is convenient to extend the hedonic wage function w to the ctitious market x 0 by setting w(x 0 ) = 0. We follow Mas-Colell's (1975) description of the price system for economies with a continuum of dierentiated commodities, and assume that wages are described by a continuous function w ∈ C + (X). The continuity assumption implies that markets for similar jobs where tightness levels are also similar have similar wages.
In a competitive search equilibrium workers and rms take wages as given. In addition, all agents have rational expectations about the tightness level θ prevailing in each market, and hence about the probability with which they will complete a transaction if they choose to enter those markets. The expected prot of a rm which rst invests in attributes a and then enters market (i) Firms choose (h, a, θ) in X to maximize their expected prots taking w * as given:
(ii) For each type s ∈ S, workers choose (h, a, θ) in X to maximize their expected utility taking w * as given:
Condition (i), together with the feasibility condition (3.1), implies that all the rms in the economy choose their ex-ante investments and the markets they enter in order to maximize their expected prots taking wages as given. Note that market (h, a, θ) attracts some rms in equilibrium whenever (h, a, θ) ∈ suppµ B * . Also, since they are ex-ante symmetric, rms make the same prots in all active markets. The rms' equilibrium prots are denoted by Π(w * ). Condition (ii), combined with the feasibility condition (3.2), is a similar optimization condition for each type of worker. In this condition, υ s (w * ) denotes the equilibrium indirect utility of a type-s worker. Market (h, a, θ) attracts type-s workers in equilibrium whenever (s, h, a, θ) ∈ suppµ S * . Some workers/rms may not to participate at all if that is optimal for them.
Finally, the rational expectations conditions on the agents' beliefs follows from the aggregate feasibility condition (3.3) imposed on the equilibrium allocation. Note that (3.3) can be written as
using (2.2), since α(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ + . Condition (3.9) says that the total measures of workers and rms who enter each active market in equilibrium generate the market tightness levels that the traders take as given when they choose which market to join (as in directed search models).
Take, for instance, an allocation which implies an atomless assignment of workers and rms across markets. In this case, dµ B (h, a, θ) is the density of rms and dµ S X (h, a, θ) is the density of workers in the set of active markets. If the traders' conjectures about the buyer-seller ratio θ are correct, dµ B (h, a, θ) should be equal to θdµ S X (h, a, θ) in this set. This is what equation (3.9) says. 20 The same interpretation applies if µ B and µ S have a mass point at (h, a, θ), except that in this case we talk about positive masses rather than densities. Note that, if a given market attracts no traders, (3.9) is vacuous since dµ B (h, a, θ) = dµ S X (h, a, θ) = 0. In other words, (3.9) is a restriction on active markets only.
A standard feature of general equilibrium models with a continuum of commodities is that the prices of those commodities which are not traded in equilibrium are indeterminate (e.g. see Mas-
Colell and Zame (1991) and Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999) ). Note that, if a market is active in our model, so (h, a, θ) ∈ suppµ B ∩ suppµ S X , the rm's optimality condition implies:
(3.10)
Also, there is some buyer types who nds it optimal to invest in h and join this market:
(3.11) Thus w * (h, a, θ) jointly satises (3.10) and (3.11).
On the other hand, for those markets which are inactive, so (h, a, θ) / ∈ suppµ B ∩ suppµ S X , w * (h, a, θ) satises:
the weak inequality signs being strict in the case of markets which rms (workers) strictly prefer not to join. Hence, w * (h, a, θ) satises: 21
(3.14) 20 Formally, (3.9) says that the restriction of µ B to H ×A× + is absolutely continuous with respect to the restriction of µ S X to the same set, the corresponding Radon-Nikodym derivative being f (h, a, θ) = θ. 21 We are abusing notation slightly here since, strictly speaking, condition (3.12) applies only when θ > 0 (because α(0) = 0) . Yet when θ = 0, (3.12) holds trivially, so the lower bound on (3.12) can be ignored.
The term in the left-hand side of (3.14) is the highest wage rms would be willing to pay to participate in this market in equilibrium. The term in the right-hand side of (3.14) is the lowest wage that a worker would accept to participate in this market in equilibrium. A market is inactive whenever the latter term exceeds the former (since opening such a market would imply negative gains from trade). In this case, the wage in this market is indeterminate. It could be as low as
, or anything in between. All these prices are consistent with the market being inactive.
22 It is common in the general equilibrium literature to use conventions which allow to select a unique supporting price system. We present an example in Section 5.1 below.
Welfare and existence theorems via Linear programming
The purpose of this section is to bring to light the connection between the planner's LP problem and competitive search equilibria. In doing so, we follow Zame (1992, 1999) and Makowski and Ostroy (1996) . We begin by exploiting a well-known duality result in mathematics.
Namely, the fact that any linear programming problem has a dual problem, which is also linear.
Whereas the planner's problem is a maximization problem which will be referred to as the primal problem, its dual is a minimization problem. The two problems are related because, as we shall see, (a) their optimal values coincide and (b) the dual variables are the shadow prices of the primal constraints and vice versa.
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The primal problem is to nd
There is a slight dierence between problem (P ) and the planner's problem described in Section 3, in that the constraint system Let q f ∈ denote the dual variable associated with constraint (4.1). In the Appendix we show that the dual variables associated with the constraint systems (4.2) and (4.3) are given by two continuous functions: q S ∈ C(S) and w ∈ C(X), respectively. 24 As we shall see, the dual variable q f measures the shadow value of having (a small mass of ) additional rms enter the economy, whereas q S (s) is the corresponding shadow value for workers of type-s. In the terminology of Ostroy (1980 Ostroy ( , 1984 and Makowski (1980) , q f represents the marginal product (or marginal contribution to social welfare) of a rm, and q S (s) is the marginal product of a type-s worker.
We abuse notation slightly by denoting the dual variable associated with (4.3) by w, which is also how we denote the market wage function. This is to emphasize the relationship between both functions. Recall that condition (4.3) says that the total number of jobs created in each market is equal to the total number of workers who nd a job in that market. In our model, the dual variable w(h, a, θ) measures the shadow value of a job when the worker has attributes h, the employer has attributes a and the job is created in market with tightness θ. In particular, the presence of search frictions implies that the shadow price of a job (just like market wages) depends not only on the job's description but also on corresponding the market tightness level.
24 q S and w lie in the topological duals of the spaces M (S) and Mc(X) (as these are the spaces where the measures ξ S and µ B lie). Since C(S) is endowed with the uniform norm topology and C(X) is endowed with the topology of uniform convergence on compact sets, M (S) and Mc(X) are the respective topological duals of these spaces. When M (S) and Mc(X) are endowed with the weak-star topology, the converse statement also holds.
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The Lagrangian associated with problem (P ) is
where we set w(x 0 ) = 0 without loss of generality (since m(θ 0 ) = α(θ 0 ) = 0). The Lagrangian can be rearranged as follows:
Finally, we may use the payo functions of rms and workers, π(h, a, θ; w) and u(s, h, a, θ; w), dened in (3.5) and (3.6) to write: h, a, θ) . It is easy to see that problem (D) is linear, once it is noted thatbecause utility is transferable w enters linearly the payo functions π(h, a, θ) and u(s, h, a, θ). The linear constraint systems (4.6)
and (4.7) have the following interpretation. The term in the right-hand side of (4.6) gives the rms' expected prots in each market (h, a, θ) ∈ X as a function of the shadow price of the jobs created in that market, w(h, a, θ). Constraint (4.6) says that q f ought to be an upper bound for the rms' expected prots in all markets. Similarly, (4.7) says that q S (s) is an upper bound for the expected utility of a type-s worker in the dierent markets (given the shadow price of the jobs created in those markets).
The above implies that the dual constraint systems (4.6) and (4.7) can also be written as and (4.9) bind at an optimum. Thus, the optimal value of w minimizes the sum of rms' prots and the indirect utilities of all the workers who live in the economy:
(4.10)
The optimal values of q f and q S in turn give rms' prots and the workers' indirect utilities at prices w o : q f o = Π(w o ) and q So (s) = υ s (w o ). 25
Denote the optimal values for problems (P ) and (D) by ν(P ) and ν(D), respectively. Theorem 1 states that these problems have optimal solutions and the same optimal value. This in turn implies that the dual variables are indeed the shadow prices of the primal constraints, and vice versa. Theorem 1. Problems (P ) and (D) have optimal solutions, and ν(P ) = ν(D).
We may then appeal to the complementary slackness theorem of linear programming to characterize optimal solutions for problems (P ) and (D) (see Anderson and Nash 1987, Theorem 3.2 Makowski and Ostroy (1996) show how the fact that the constraints of the dual problem can be incorporated into the objective function is characteristic of the LP version of general equilibrium. They make this point in the context of a frictionless exchange economies with transferable utility and a nite number of divisible goods. In the Appendix, we show that feasible dual solutions satisfy q f ≥ 0 and q S ≥ 0, so individual rationality holds (see Lemma A.2) . This is indeed a general property of the LP formulation of Makowski and Ostroy (1996) and Zame (1992, 1999) , where individual rationality constraints appear in the dual (rather than in the primal problem). We also show that w ≥ 0 without loss of generality. 19 problems (P ) and (D) are optimal if and only if they satisfy the complementary slackness conditions: As in Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992) and Makowski and Ostroy (1996) , the complementary slackness theorem allows to establish the equivalence between constrained ecient allocations and competitive equilibria. Specically, Theorem 2 implies that equilibrium allocations coincide with the optimal solutions to problem (P ), whereas the rms' prots, the workers' indirect utilities and the wages in equilibrium coincide with the optimal solutions to problem (D). According to Theorem 2, an allocation (µ B , µ S ) is constrained ecient if it is feasible and there exists shadow prices (q f , q S , w) which satisfy the dual feasibility constraints (4.6) and (4.7) and the complementary slackness conditions (4.11) and (4.12). Yet (4.6) and (4.11) are equivalent to the rms' prot maximization condition in the denition of a competitive equilibrium (condition (i)).
Indeed, (4.6) and (4.11) say that the measure µ B assigns rms to market (h f , a f , θ f ) if and only if entering such a market is a prot maximizing choice for rms at wages w. The optimal value of q f then gives the rms' prots in equilibrium. Similarly, (4.7) and (4.12) are equivalent of condition (ii) in Denition 1, since they say that µ S assigns type-s workers to market (h s , a s , θ s ) if and only if participating in this market is an optimal choice for these workers given w. Hence, the optimal value of q S (s) gives the indirect utility of type-s workers in equilibrium. Finally, the optimal value of w describes the transfers that rms need to pay workers in each market in order to decentralize the allocation (µ B , µ S ). 26
The existence of a competitive equilibrium follows directly from Theorem 1 and Part II in Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. A competitive equilibrium exists.
Extensions and discussion
There are several variants of the model presented so far that involve straightforward variations of the linear programming formulation in Section 4, and where essentially the same argument allows to establish the equivalent constrained eciency and existence results. Here we briey discuss two of them: the variant of the model with free entry, and the more general model where rms are heterogeneous ex-ante.
Free entry
With free entry of rms, the feasibility constraint (4.1) disappears, as the mass of rms that enter the economy is now endogenous. Also, an entry cost κ is typically introduced, and so the rms'
prots are now given by:
π(h, a, θ; w) = α(θ) [f (h, a) − w(h, a, θ)] − C(a) − κ.
(5.1) Apart from this, the only other change in the denition of a competitive search equilibrium is that the zero prot condition must hold: Π(w * ) is set to zero in condition (i). In terms of the linear programming formulation, eliminating constraint (4.1) from the primal is essentially equivalent to setting q f = 0 in the dual problem. In proving the constrained eciency and existence results, virtually the same arguments go through.
26 To be precise, one also needs to show is that the function υs(w * ) is continuous in s, so it lies in the same space u is continuous, and, because µ S * has compact support, so does µ S * X .
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The free entry assumption highly simplies the model when rms are ex-ante symmetric. For instance, one may tackle the price indeterminacy by selecting the highest prices that support the equilibrium allocation. In our model this is equivalent to selecting a supporting wage function which satises w(h, a, θ) = f (h, a) − C(a) + κ α(θ) .
(5.2) At these prices, rms make zero prots in all markets, whether active or not. 27 The reason why this selection criterion is particularly useful is that it directly pins down the equilibrium wage function.
5.2
Two-sided ex-ante heterogeneity (5.4)
General equilibrium model
As before, an allocation assigns rms and workers of dierent types across markets. Formally, an allocation is described by a pair (μ B ,μ S ) ∈ M c+ (X) × M c+ (S ×X). In particular,μ B (Ω) is the measure of rms assigned to an arbitrary Borel set of marketsΩ ⊆X (i.e., the aggregate labor demand in these markets).
Feasibility requires that the total measure of rms of a given type b who are assigned under an allocation be equal to the measure of such types who are present in the population. So (4.1) is
The second feasibility constraint (3.2) is essentially unaltered (except for the fact that X has been replaced byX ):μ S S = ξ S . The third feasibility constraint, which says that the total number of jobs created in an arbitrary set of markets is equal to the total number of workers who nd a job in those markets, is a simple variant of (3.3): (5.5)
In the denition of a competitive equilibrium, the only substantial change regards condition (i), which now says that all rm types b ∈ B make prot maximizing choices.
Denition 2. A competitive search equilibrium is a feasible allocation (μ B ,μ S ) ∈ M c+ (X)×M c+ (S × X) and a wage functionŵ * ∈ C + (X) such that: Again, the feasibility condition (5.5) implies a rational expectations condition on equilibrium beliefs:
The interpretation of this condition is essentially as before).
LP formulation and main results
The primal LP problem in this general model is to where (as before) the objective function describes the economy's total welfare.
The shadow price of constraint (5.9) (rather than a real number) is a continuous functionq B ∈ C(B). This function describes the marginal contribution to social welfare of the dierent rm types.
The spaces where the other dual variables lie are essentially unaltered (except that, since X has been replaced byX , the shadow price of constraint (5.11) now lies in C(X)). (5.14)
One can again show that problems (P G ) and (D G ) have optimal solutions and the same optimal value. The proof of this result is a simple variant of that of Theorem 2 in Jerez (2014) , which (for completeness) is presented in the Appendix.
28 In the light of this result, it is direct to show that the complementary slackness theorem again implies an equivalence between competitive search equilibria and the optimal solutions to the LP problems, and the existence of a competitive search equilibrium.
Appendix A A.1 Notation
We begin with some preliminary notation.
Take a metric space Z which is locally compact and separable. Let C(Z) denote the space of continuous real-valued functions on Z, endowed with the topology of uniform convergence on compact sets. The topological dual of C(Z) is the space M c (Z) of signed regular Borel measures on Z with compact support (see Hewitt (1959) ). We let M c (Z) be endowed with the weak-star topology, so C(Z) is also the dual of M c (Z). The dual pair of spaces (C(Z), M c (Z)) is endowed with the standard bilinear form:
where the bracket notation highlights the innite dimensional nature of the spaces in the pairing.
In the special case where Z is compact, the topological dual of C(Z) is the space M (Z) of signed regular Borel measures on Z. 29 (If Z is nite, both C(Z) and M (Z) are isomorphic to the Euclidean space). We write C + (Z), M c+ (Z) and M + (Z) for the positive cones of the three spaces.
For any integer n, the product spaces j=1,...,n C(Z j ) and j=1,...,n M c (Z j ) are endowed with 28 The argument is slightly dierent from that in Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1992) and Makowski and Ostroy (1996) mainly because, unlike in their papers, the measures describing an allocation are dened over a non-compact set.
29 As noted by Hewitt (1959) , the topology of uniform convergence on compact sets coincides with the uniform norm topology in this case. the corresponding product topologies, and are also paired in duality with bilinear form: n j=1 f j , γ j , (f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n ) ∈ j=1,...,n C(Z j ), (γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ n ) ∈ j=1,...,n M c (Z j ).
A.2
The primal and dual linear programming problems This section includes the formal description of the primal and dual LP problems in Section 5.2. To simplify notation, we drop all the hats (that were used in the production and cost functions and in all the variables to dierentiate that Section from the model in Section 3).
Before stating the primal problem, a remark about constraint (5.5) is in order. We have written this constraint as:
The left-hand side of this constraint describes a measure which is absolutely continuous with respect to µ B with Radon-Nikodym derivativeα(b, a, h, θ) = α(θ).
Similarly, the right-hand side of (4.3) describes a measure which is absolutely continuous with respect to µ S X with Radon-Nikodym derivativem(b, a, h, θ) = m(θ). Constraint (4.3) says that these two measures, which lie in M c (X) and which we denote by η(α, µ B ) and η(π, µ S X ) respectively, are equal:
Using the standard (compact) notation, the primal problem is to nd
Formally, problem (P ) is an equality constrained LP problem (see Anderson and Nash 1987) .
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The dual problem is to nd y = (q B , q S , w) ∈ C(B) × C(S) × C(X) to solve
This is precisely the dual problem stated in Section 5.2.
A.3 Existence of optimal solutions and absence of a duality gap
In this section we prove that problems (P G ) and (D) G have optimal solutions and the same optimal value: ν(P G ) = ν(D G ) (i.e., the general version of Theorem 1). In doing so, we rely on the assumptions that f , v, C and c and the matching function M are continuous, and B, S, H and A are compact sets. This, combined with the fact that trading probabilities are bounded, is all we need to prove these results.
We begin by showing that both problems are consistent (i.e. their feasible sets are not empty) and bounded (i.e. ν(P G ) and ν(D G ) are nite).
Lemma A. 1. Problems (P G ) and (D G ) are consistent and bounded.
Proof. An allocation where workers make no investments (so they all choose h = h 0 ), neither do rms (who choose a = a 0 ) and all agents are assigned to a ctitious market where θ = θ 0 is a feasible solution for problem (P G ). Hence, problem (P G ) is consistent. Also, since total welfare is zero under autarky, ν(P G ) ≥ 0.
In problem (D G ), set w = w 1 ∈ C(X) where w 1 (b, h, a, θ) = 0 for all (b, h, a, θ) ∈ X. In the constraint systems (4.6) and (4.7), α(θ) and m(θ) are bounded above by one and below by zero (since they are probabilities). One then can nd a feasible dual solution where w = w 1 by choosing q B 1 ∈ C(B) and q S 1 ∈ C(S) constant so that 
Finally, by the weak duality theorem (Anderson and Nash 1987, Theorem 2.1), ν(P G ) ≤ ν(D G ), 27 so the primal and dual problems are bounded:
Next, we show that problem (P G ) is solvable.
Theorem A. 1. Problem (P G ) has optimal solutions.
Proof. The feasible set of problem (P G ) is bounded, and the constraint map and objective function are weak-star continuous, so the result follows from Theorem 3.20 in Anderson and Nash (1987) .
We also show that problems (P G ) and (D G ) have the same optimal value. Theorem A. 2. There is no duality gap: ν(P G ) = ν(D G ).
Proof. The positive cone of C(X) × C(S × X) has a non-empty interior, denoted by Y 0 . Also,
1 is a Slater point in the feasible set of problem (D G ). Since ν(D G ) is nite, Theorem 3.13 in Anderson and Nash (1987) implies that ν(P G ) = ν(D G ).
We still need to show that problem (D G ) is solvable. We begin by stating two preliminary results.
Lemma A.2 shows that the set of feasible dual solutions can be taken to be bounded without loss of generality. The proof uses the fact that f, v, c and C are continuous, α and m are bounded, and B, S, H and A are compact sets. Lemma A.3 shows that the tightness level θ can be restricted without loss of generality to lie on a compact subset of + (e.g. to be bounded above).
Lemma A. 2. The set of feasible dual solutions can be taken to be bounded without loss of generality.
In particular, feasible dual solutions satisfy q B ≥ 0 and q S ≥ 0. Also, we may assume that q B and q S are bounded above and that Proof. Substituting (5. 3) into the dual constraint system (5.13) and setting θ = θ 0 , h = h 0 and a = a 0 implies that q B ≥ 0. Likewise, substituting (5.4) into the dual constraint system (5.14) and setting θ = θ 0 , h = h 0 and a = a 0 implies that q S ≥ 0.
For a given (b, h, a, θ) ∈ B × H × A × ++ , if an optimal primal solution satises (b, h, a, θ) ∈ suppµ B then (s, b, h, a, θ) ∈ suppµ S for somes ∈ S. This is because the restrictions of µ B and µ S X to B ×H ×A× ++ are mutually absolutely continuous measures, and so they have the same support. 30 (There is always such a (b, h, a, θ), when one focuses on the interesting case where autarky is not an optimal allocation.) By the complementary slackness theorem, in this case, optimal dual solutions satisfy Proof. Suppose the statement in Lemma A.3 were not true. Let (µ B , µ S ) be an optimal primal solution. Take an increasing sequence {θ j } ⊂ + with θ j → ∞. For each j there then exists (b j , h j , a j ,θ j ) ∈ suppµ B withθ j > θ j . Equivalently, (s j , b j , h j , a j ,θ j ) ∈ suppµ S for some s j ∈ S, since the restrictions of µ B and µ S X to B × H × A × ++ are mutually exclusive measures which have the same support. (If not, the complementary slackness theorem would imply that the dual constraints associated to all θ > θ j can be ignored without loss of generality, since they do not bind). But then the support of µ B contains the sequence {(b j , h j , a j ,θ j )} where limθ j → ∞, leading to a contradiction since this support is compact by denition.
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The solvability of problem (D G ) cannot be settled using an argument similar to that in Theorem A.1 because the space of continuous functions on a compact set is not the dual of any normed space. We follow the approach used in Anderson and Nash (1987) for the continuous transportation problem (see their Theorem 5.2) and repose problem (D G ) in an enlarged space which does have this property. Then we appeal to the continuity of the f , v, C and c and the matching function, and the compactness of B, H and A to show that an optimal solution in the enlarged space lies in the original space.
Theorem A. 3. Problem (D G ) has optimal solutions.
Proof. Let us repose problem
optimal for problem (P ). (This space is the dual of L 1 (ξ B ) × L 1 (ξ S ) × L 1 (µ B )). The new dual problem is solvable by Theorem 3.20 in Anderson and Nash (1987) since Lemma A.2 implies that its feasible set can be taken to be bounded without loss of generality.
We now show that there exists an optimal solution of this new problem where the functions q B , q S and w are continuous. Suppose (q B , q S , w) is optimal for the new dual problem. for (b, h, a, θ) ∈ B × H × A × + , and w 2 (·, θ 0 ) = 0. Then, (q B , q S , w 2 ) is another optimal solution.
We now show that the restriction of w 2 to B × H × A × (0,θ] is continuous. Take a sequence {s i } in S such that (q S (s i ) + m(θ)v(s i , b, h, a) + c(s i , h)) converges to α(θ)w 2 (b, h, a, θ). Since B×H×A×[0,θ] is compact, m(θ)v(s, b, h, a)+c(s, h) is uniformly continuous on B×S×H×A×[0,θ]. A symmetric argument implies that m(θ)w 2 (b, h, a, θ) − ≤ α(θ )w 2 (b , h , a , θ ). (A.14) for any such (b , h , a , θ ) and (b, h, a, θ). Hence, the restriction of α(θ)w 2 (b, h, a, θ) to B × H × A × [0,θ] is continuous. Since m is continuous and strictly positive when θ ∈ (0,θ], the restriction of w 2 (b, h, a, θ) to B × H × A × (0,θ] (the quotient of two continuous functions) is continuous.
To see that w 2 is continuous, take an increasing sequence of compact sets {Θ j } converging to Θ ∪ {θ 0 }; e.g. Θ j = [ j , θ j ] ∪ {θ 0 } with j ↓ 0 and k j ↑ ∞. Consider the sequence of functions {f j } where f j = χ Θ j w 2 , where χ Θ j denotes the characteristic function on Θ j (so w 2 and f j coincide on Θ j ). Since f j is continuous on Θ j and w 2 = lim j→∞ f j , it follows that w 2 is continuous. yields yet another optimal solution (q B 2 , q S 2 , w 2 ) since, by Lemma A.3, the constraints associated with elements θ >θ can be ignored without loss of generality in (4.6)-(4.7). By Berge's Maximum Theorem, q B 2 and q S 2 are continuous.
The former results imply the equivalent results to Theorems 24 in Section 4. The argument is essentially the same, and is thus ommitted.
